2:Sanders E-5 (no date) 1949 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

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An intelligent woman once summed up for me the peasant's attitude toward labor and money in this terse fashion:

"Most people work because they want money. Everyone looks for money."

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Although the peasant considered money of greater importance than formerly because he was becoming more and more a part of a money economy, he really handled very little in the course of a year. The annual income for a family of four or five was less than two hundred dollars, an amount that came into the family coffer in driblets and was paid out as slowly as possible. After the autumn market or the sale of a cow, the peasant was flush with money, but when he had bought the necessities which he could not produce for himself (kerosene, shoes and other articles of clothing, rice, salt, and some hardware) he was little better off financially. If a member of the family worked outside the home, his wages were a considerable help, especially when some of the many taxes were due.

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I asked nine young men, picked at random, about the money they earned. Their monthly income varied from the meager equivalent of $6 a month earned by a twenty-five-year-old servant and an eighteen-year-old shepherd to $66 earned by a twenty-year-old milkman. There was only one who kept more than half of his earnings for himself. He explained apologetically that the reason he did not turn these over to his father was that he had to pay board and rent in Sofia, where he worked.

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Very few Dragalevtsy people accumulated savings in the bank. They preferred, like people all over Bulgaria, to invest money in real estate. The city people did it because of the security of investment, whereas the peasants, especially in Dragalevtsy, were more interested in possessing land for its own sake.

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The great majority of the peasants were in debt, though many debtors were also creditors. Those specializing in field crops preferred long-term loans, usually for fifteen or twenty years, with land as security, while sheep owners usually sought short-term loans of three or four months. One village merchant, to whom many peasants came for advice, estimated that 70 per cent of the loans were taken from banks and 30 per cent from individuals. The government had done much in the past through periodic moratoria to reduce the amount of indebtedness.

[652]

2:Sanders E-5 (no date) 1949 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

"We would have starved," he said, "if America had not sent that ship of food to Varna on the Black Sea." Truly such an accomplishment by one ship would necessitate a cargo legendary in size, but nevertheless symbolized to Bai Milush and others of his generation the humanitarian America, the land of plenty, opportunity, and democracy. And then he told me of the work that Dominic Murphy, an American State Department representative in Bulgaria, had done in the wake of the last war to meet the relief needs of the people. And even Bai Milush knew that a street in Sofia bore Murphy's name transliterated into the Cyrillic alphabet.

Bai Milush's wife, his helpmate through the years, had survived the war too. She proffered food and drink and seemed relieved when I suggested that instead of eating then I would like to take a little of the cheese away with me to use in rounding out my meager hotel breakfasts in Sofia. Later, when I was photographing her outside, I realized that she was unsteady on her feet because she had taken too much *rakiya* as a medicine for a racking cough. *Rakiya* remained the cure-all for every ailment as well as the solace to every sorrow.

Wherever I turned, whether to look at the new houses Bai Milush had erected, or to talk with the peasants about the past few years, I was impressed by the prosperity that the war had brought. Since I had last seen Dragalevtsy, almost one hundred new houses had made their appearance, constituting a decided boom for a village which had boasted only three hundred earlier. Some of these houses had been built as villas by people from Sofia because the city law prohibited any new construction there. The various bombardments had caused so much destruction in the city that nothing but repairs were allowed. Nevertheless, the peasants of Dragalevtsy themselves were replacing old homes with new ones simply because they could afford it now.

I had already learned that during the war the peasants had been the favored element of the Bulgarian population; they had been paid good prices as incentives to increased production; earlier in the war they could use that money to buy articles which they had always wanted but had not been able to afford. For example, the number of radios in the village rose from three or four in 1937 to more than a hundred in 1944.

467 racy can be . . . their constantly teaching the working class that the only correct road is the organization of patriotic socialist competitions and the fulfillment of the state economic plans."[*] And the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party[**] added that "the most important role of the trade unions in a proletarian dictatorship is their organizational-economic and educational role—their role as schools of communism."

It seems obvious that trade unions in a democratic country and their Communist counterpart have absolutely nothing in common except their name. In fact, their nature, functions and aims are diametrically opposed to each other. In Bulgaria, they are channels of the Communist government and can be best compared with an economic police force, operating in factories and other places where the economic plans of the government are being implemented.

How, then, is it at all possible to speak about collective bargaining, when the two contracting parties are, in last analysis, representatives of one and the same Communist state authority? Still, the Bulgarian Communists persist in using the term "collective" or "individual labor contract,"[***] although in theory as well as in practice they exclude any conflict-of-interest matters from contractual regulation. Following the Soviet
●465 example, even wages and standards of out-
656 put are excluded as subjects of bargaining and reserved for exclusive governmental regulation. Wages in Communist Bulgaria are determined on the basis of "labor norms"—that is, production quotas—prescribed by the government for each category of workers. If a worker is not able to fulfill his norm, he is paid according to the quantity and quality of the finished product. This piece-work system is the antipode of the system of hourly wages and was banished in 1905 as a remnant of Turkish feudalism."
466 Thus, the Bulgarian Government is absolute
656 master in decreeing all important labor

Preustroyavaneto na Sotsializma v Nas (Sofia: 1951), p. 98, in Bulgarian.

** Cf. Pt. II, Ch. I and II of the Code of Labor.

*** Indicative of Communist hypocrisy is the fact that, before 1905, the Bulgarian Communists were bitter opponents of the piece-work system, even for shoemakers, denouncing it as "the most detestable exploitation by the hyenas of private capitalism." Ivan Iliev, *Bubotvoritelno Syndicalno Dvizhenije v Bulgaria* (Sofia: 1927), p. 37, in Bulgarian. Communists everywhere, if out of power, violently oppose piece-work, yet introduce and hail it as "the most progressive achievement of the socialist state," once they take over.

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> The Soviet trade unions generally supervise the carrying out of the plans for the construction of dwellings and communal buildings and take part in the distribution of new buildings to the workers, and in this connection their proposals have a decisive importance.—Leonid Nikolaevich Solovyov, Secretary, All-Union Central Council of Trades Unions, USSR.

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half an hour more than twice a month."[39] It should be understood that the minimum consequence of a dismissal is labor mobilization.

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The following remarks of an authority on Soviet labor have full validity for Communist Bulgaria as well: "The fear of being late became a nightmare to workers, many of whom had no watches or clocks, and sent them speeding to work in frantic haste. The same fear made them gulp their lunch as quickly as possible."[40] It sounds unbelievable that such a casual infraction as tardiness can ultimately lead to imprisonment or forced labor.

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As to inefficiency, the recently enacted Decree for Payment of Dead Time and Rejects in Industry, Construction and Transport[41] supplemented the disciplinary punishments of the Labor Code by introducing financial liability for stoppage and defective output. The most unusual feature represents the fact that a worker is deprived of up to 30 per cent of his wage even if he is not responsible for the stoppage or defective output.[42]

This Communist anomaly is even more clear in the provisions regulating the financial responsibility for damages caused to the enterprise. Guided by the principle that "socialist property" is more precious than

[39] Grounds for dismissal in Art. 33 of the Labor Code.
[40] Work by Schwarz, cited at footnote 1, p. 105.
[41] *Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranie*, No. 32, April 21, 1953.
[42] Art. 2 and 7 of the Decree for Payment of Dead Time and Rejects.
[43] Cf. Arts. 1 and 51 of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (*Ugolovni Kodex RSFSR*, in Russian). Also, Arts. 1 and 31 of the Bulgarian Penal Code of 1951.
[44] Art. 98 of the Labor Code.
[45] Cf. Art. 2 of the Penal Code.
[46] Art. 208, par. 2 of the Labor Code.
[47] This complete disregard for tradition and objective conditions has so much disorganized the national economy and antagonized the

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● 465 human life and that the "social harm" of an offense is all that matters," Communist legislation makes a worker "responsible for an amount higher than the actually caused damages," " besides, of course, his liability under criminal law.

It is evident that all these financial liability provisions not only reduce the already very low wages of the Bulgarian workers but also violate internationally accepted legal principles—such as the exclusion of liability exceeding actual damage or of liability without guilt or negligence. This is not surprising if one bears in mind that the Bulgarian Penal Code also recognizes the application of the principle of analogy in criminal law," and the Labor Code proclaims the principle that "acts of indictment have the force of proof until the contrary is proven" "—that is, one is presumed guilty unless he proves his innocence.

177 46 466 185 Analysis of labor and relations in Communist Bulgaria leads to the conclusion that the Bulgarian labor pattern is a carbon copy of the Soviet original. Neither democratic traditions nor social harmony have been taken into consideration. In their blind imitation, the Bulgarian Communists are trying to change the very basis of Bulgarian economy—from agriculture to heavy industry—as if they were mightier than the very nature which deprived the country of the elements required for such a transformation. Their only guiding light is the Soviet example, no matter how detrimental its application on Bulgarian soil might be."

000 The Bulgarian case—most suitable to test Communism in export—has brutally refuted any illusion that Communism can be "different" if applied in more advanced societies. The tragic paradox of the Communist experiment with the Bulgarian workers is that the alleged primary beneficiaries of the new "socialist order" have, instead, received the harshest possible deal. [The End]

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461 461 population that purges of scapegoats and acts of dispair have been a permanent feature in Bulgaria as well. The workers, in particular, have dashed pointed guns during the recent open unrest in Plovdiv, the second largest Bulgarian city, and in many other cities (Pleven, Pernik, Haskovo, Gorna Dubumaja). In order to prevent the worst, the government, under Moscow's guidance, has announced a so-called new course, consisting of promises to raise the living standard and to relax the socialist labor discipline. The implementation of these promises is still to come. They clearly imply, however, that the Communist experiment has not succeeded in either converting the Bulgarian workers to Communism or breaking their spirit of resistance. (For details, see work cited at footnote 29, Ch. VIII-X.)

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